There have been several articles published on the surprise attack by the Luftwaffe on the port of Bari on the evening of 2 December 1943. It claimed the lives of 83 people (possibly more from the long-term effects), destroyed 17 ships and resulted in the loss of 39,000 tons of supplies.[i] It was a remarkable raid on several counts: the use of windowing by the German planes to evade radar, the involvement of chemical weapons on board the S.S. John Harvey, and the advances made in cancer treatment as a result of treating those affected.[ii] Many of the American articles focus on the hubris of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, who allegedly told a press conference earlier that day that, “I would regard it as a personal affront and insult if the Luftwaffe should attempt any significant action in this area”.[iii] Fewer articles, however, look at the logistical consequences of the attack.
From a supply perspective, the raid occurred at a critical time when the Allied forces were rapidly increasing the number of men in Italy. There were 16 Allied divisions, together with supporting Air Forces, in Italy in December 1943. By March 1944, plans were in place to increase the number of divisions to 22, which would require a daily supply ration of 32,180 tons to sustain them.[iv] US Engineers were working flat out to increase the capacity of all of Italy’s ports to cope with this massive requirement.
Image Credit: The Morning after the Big Raid at Bari, Italy by BERNARD HAILSTONE, 1943. IWM (Art.IWM ART LD 4054)
At 7.30pm on 2 December a force of almost 100 German bombers attacked the crowded port of Bari, dropping bombs and mines for around 20 minutes. The four Beaufighters sent up to intercept the JU-88s failed to shoot any down, although anti-aircraft fire claimed two kills. One of the first ships to be hit was the John Harvey, which was at the mole being unloaded at the time. It contained high-explosive ammunition and also 100 tons of 100-lb mustard gas bombs. According to Captain D. M. Saunders, U. S. Navy:
“the bombs containing the liquid mustard were not fused, many of the thin casings were shattered. Liquid mustard began spreading insidiously across the harbor, some of it sinking, some burning, some mixing with oil floating on the surface and some of it evaporating and mingling with the clouds of smoke and flame.”[v]
The explosions from the ammunition ship led to harbour installations and other vessels in the closely-packed harbour being damaged. Peter Bickmore, a Royal Navy Coastal Forces veteran, witnessed the raid and the subsequent chaos:
“The JOHN HARVEY was repeatedly hit and set on fire burning fiercely until the ammunition went off with a great explosion. When the dust settled, the liquid mustard gas lay on the surface of the sea, mixing with oil and other fuels used by the sunken vessels.”[vi]
The raid was a complete surprise but had a longer term impact on the city. Naomi Jacob, an ENSA Welfare Officer in Bari noted in her memoir:
“We were told that the raid was the most successful that Germany had during the whole war. For weeks one lived in artificial light for there was not much glass in Bari and not sufficient workmen to replace broken windows if there had been.”[vii]
Port authorities were slow to admit that the John Harvey had been carrying chemical weapons, which led to greater casualty numbers. The pungent smell of garlic and the symptoms of the casualties, who on the face of it, only had minor burns but were dying of the toxic effect of the mustard, led to an investigation. “The failure to take simple prophylactic measures, such as a bath, resulted in many deaths that need not have occurred”, was the conclusion of Captain D. M. Saunders. You can see Pathe News footage of the raid here:
Quite apart from the human tragedy, the raid meant that the port of Bari was unable to meet its standard daily capacity of 6,000 tons for almost three weeks. The fact that there were well over 39,000 tons of supplies destroyed by the German planes indicates the massive backlog in Bari by 2 December. Even working at full capacity, Bari’s stevedores would have taken a week to unload all of the supplies lost during the raid. This would have excluded dealing with any new shipping that would have arrived in the meantime. The other ports used for supplies on the east coast, Brindisi (3,500 tons per day) and Barletta (1,500 tons per day), could not make up for the capacity lost at Bari.[viii] The Eighth Army would have used the vast majority of this capacity fighting up the East Coast.
The overall impact of the Bari raid on the war effort in Italy can be shown to be higher than the 39,000 tons on the day. Considering that Bari was not working at capacity for much of December, the loss could have been as high as 165,000 tons of supplies.[ix] To put this figure into perspective, one British division required a daily supply of 650 tons for maintenance.[x] The Bari raid, therefore, would have had a significant impact on the war effort in December 1943; however, the Allies recovered remarkably quickly. Thanks to the efforts of the engineers, a total of 346,494 tons of general cargo was delivered to the three main Italian east coast ports throughout January 1944.[xi]
More concerning perhaps was the careless logistical, not to mention safety, implication of mislaying chemical weapons. It was not the first time that gas shells had been loaded onto a ship, and authorities were not necessarily aware of the details or were slow to act. During Operation Husky, gas shells had been accidentally packed on board one of the US ships involved in the landings in Sicily, but no one seemed to know precisely which ship.[xii] They were eventually tracked down. The consequences for the conflict as a whole if the Allies had mistakenly used or accused Germany of using chemical weapons do not bear thinking about. Thankfully, the Allies appear to have learned from these lessons and kept tighter control of these weapons for the rest of the war.
[i] Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume V The Campaign in Sicily 1943 AND The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944, ed. by Sir James Butler, History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series, 5 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973), p. 561.
[iv] Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume V The Campaign in Sicily 1943 AND The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944, p. 412.
[vii] Naomi Jacob, Me and the Mediterranean, First Edition (Hutchinson & co., ltd, 1945), p. 60.
[viii] Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume V The Campaign in Sicily 1943 AND The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944, p. 414.
[ix] Factoring in 21 days where Bari could have been unloading 6,000 tons a day plus the 39,000 tons that was lost
[x] Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume V The Campaign in Sicily 1943 AND The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944, p. 396.
[xi] Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume V The Campaign in Sicily 1943 AND The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944, p. 415.
[xii] Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944, The Liberation Trilogy, Volume 2, 1st ed (Henry Holt, 2007), p. 34.